common-pool resource

common-pool resource, a resource made available to all by consumption and to which access can be limited only at high cost. Some classic examples of common-pool resources are fisheries, forests, underwater basins, and irrigation systems.

Common-pool resources are susceptible to overuse and are thus prone to “tragedies of the commons,” which are present when individual and group interests are in conflict. In the case of fishing, fishermen face the temptation to harvest as many fish as possible, because if they do not, someone else will. Collectively, this leads to a tragedy of the commons, even though no one intended it and all realize that they would be better off if they avoided it.

However, the prediction that the tragedy of the commons model makes is that individuals’ interests will always come ahead of those of the group, and, because of that, they will not cooperate to devise solutions to the tragedies. In the 1980s, scholars challenged this assertion. As a result, a theory on common-pool resources emerged.

The first generation of research on common-pool resources centred its efforts on identifying resource systems where tragedies of the commons had been successfully avoided. They found a variety of institutional arrangements common to all successful cases and absent in those that failed. Cases varied across cultures and time, and the numbers of institutional arrangements found were many. Most of them, however, aimed at regulating individual action through rules that users agreed to abide by so that all users could take into account the social benefits and costs of using the common-pool resource. Although the specific rules adopted to govern a common-pool resource are extremely numerous, scholars have identified seven broad categories of rules according to their function: boundary rules, authority rules, position rules, scope rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules. The rule taxonomy has helped scholars to understand that rules have a configurational nature. While some rule configurations tend to result in tragedies, others can achieve different policy outcomes.

While the initial wave of research allowed identifying institutional arrangements that are related to the emergence and sustainability of collective action for the governance of common-pool resources, scholars later focused their research efforts on finding the causal relationships among those institutional arrangements previously identified.

In the decades following the emergence of the common-pool resources project in the mid-1980s, the study of common-pool resources became a field in itself. After years of research, some of the most substantive lessons include the recognition that (1) the model of the tragedy of the commons is limited; (2) autonomy to design and change rules, the ability of resource users to engage in direct communication, and their salience over the resource are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of self-organized institutions; (3) one policy form cannot ensure successful governance of all common-pool resources; and (4) the meaning of success will vary and be related to the group’s interests.

Finally, some of the major key understudied issues of common-pool resources that scholars are trying to draw attention to are the dynamics of resource-management institutions, the extension of insights to more kinds of common-pool resources, the effects of context on resource-management institutions, and the role of linkages across institutions.