Background of the trial of Socrates
The trial of Socrates in 399 bce occurred soon after Athens’s defeat at the hands of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bce). Not only were Sparta and Athens military rivals during those years, they also had radically different forms of government. Athens was a democracy: all its adult male citizens were members of the Assembly; many of the city’s offices were filled by lot (election was regarded as undemocratic, because it effectively pronounced some citizens better qualified than others); and its citizens enjoyed a high degree of freedom to live and speak as they liked, provided that they obeyed the law and did nothing to undermine the democracy and the public good. Sparta, by contrast, was a mixed regime based on a complex power-sharing arrangement between various elite groups and ordinary citizens, and it exerted far more control than Athens did over education and the daily life of its citizens.
There was in Athens, particularly among the well-born, wealthy, and young, a degree of admiration for certain aspects of Spartan life and government. These young men, who spent much of their time in the public gymnasia, prided themselves on their toughness, practiced a certain simplicity of style, and grew their hair long—all in imitation of Spartan ways. (As Plato and Xenophon confirm, Socrates himself shared some of these qualities. In Aristophanes’ Birds [414], the young who express their admiration for Sparta are said to be “Socratizing.”) No doubt the fact that Athens, an empire-building city with vast resources and a large population, could not defeat smaller and poorer Sparta—and, in the end, lost its empire to that rival regime—added to the allure of the Spartan political system and way of life.
Ordinary Athenians—people who had to work for a living and did not belong to any of the aristocratic families—were proud of their democratic institutions and the freedoms they enjoyed, and they were well aware that their form of government had internal as well as external enemies and critics. Furthermore, they did not think of civic and religious matters as separate spheres but assumed instead that participation in the religious life of the city, as regulated by democratic institutions, was one of the duties of all citizens and that great harm could come to the city if the gods it recognized were offended or customary religious prohibitions were violated.