Humanitarian aid

Humanitarian aid was promised by numerous organizations—spearheaded by the United Nations and the International Red Cross—and many countries in the region and around the world sent doctors, relief workers, and supplies in the wake of the disaster. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton, who had in May 2009 been named the UN special envoy to Haiti, was assigned the task of coordinating the efforts of the disparate aid initiatives. In the ensuing months, Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive expressed concern that foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—which were numerous in Haiti even prior to the quake and which bore responsibility for diverse aspects of the recovery—were not sufficiently accounting for the use of their resources, making it challenging for the Haitian government to assess where its own resources could best be deployed. The NGOs, in turn, were hindered by their own unwieldy bureaucratic structures and found interorganizational communication difficult. The U.S. military—though providing considerable initial support in the form of equipment, logistics coordination, and personnel—had withdrawn all but a fraction of its forces by the second week of March, leaving UN peacekeepers and Haitian police to maintain order.

Using a model that had proved successful in Europe after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, programs were initiated abroad whereby mobile phone users could make donations via text messages. A sizeable portion of the aid gathered in the United States was channeled through mobile phone companies. A celebrity telethon hosted by Haitian American rapper Wyclef Jean in New York City and American actor George Clooney in Los Angeles and featuring numerous other entertainers was broadcast internationally and generated over $60 million.

A significant portion of Haiti’s debt had been canceled in 2009 as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, but the country still owed more than $1 billion to a range of creditors. With its economy barely functioning, the country appeared unlikely to meet those obligations. In February the G7 countries forgave the remaining portion of Haiti’s debt to them, and in March the Inter-American Development Bank forgave $447 million and pledged over $30 million in further support. The World Bank forgave the country’s $36 million balance in May.

A UN donor conference in New York City in late March generated pledges of $9.9 billion, with $5.3 billion to be used during the first two years of reconstruction efforts. The bulk of the sum was put forth by the United States and the European Union (EU). The donor conference also established the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, a partnership between the Haitian government and foreign donors that, under the chairmanship of Clinton and Bellerive, oversaw the dispersal of aid funds to a variety of reconstruction efforts. The commission was approved by the Haitian parliament in April. Its mandate expired the following October, with few of its projects having been completed.

Two years after the quake, several million dollars worth of pledges had been retracted by various donors (a move permissible within the guidelines of the donor conference). Of the remaining $4.5 billion pledged for the initial two-year recovery period, slightly more than half was received by the recovery fund and disbursed. A Freedom of Information Act request by the Associated Press revealed that a little over 10 percent of the funds released had gone into infrastructure investment and over $300 million had been spent on projects begun prior to the quake—HIV/AIDS mitigation prominent among them—because their frameworks were already in place. A total of approximately $6 billion had been released by the end of 2012, but significant portions of that sum remained unspent.

A report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in June 2013 asserted that USAID—which was responsible for managing nearly half of the $1.14 billion in funds allocated by Congress in 2010—had actually spent only a third of those monies. The report further contended that the agency had miscalculated significantly in its estimates of the time and money required to complete a port attached to the massive Caracol Industrial Park, which was erected on Haiti’s northern coast at a cost of some $300 million in international donations and opened in October 2012. The port—the construction of which was two years behind schedule—was seen as a necessary component of the project, which aimed to revive the manufacturing sector in Haiti. The GAO report also noted that USAID had substantially underestimated the costs of a major housing project, leading to an 80 percent reduction in the projected number of residences to be completed. The contracts for the overwhelming majority of reconstruction work were awarded to foreign companies.

A report released by the investigative journalism platform ProPublica and American National Public Radio (NPR) in June 2015 alleged massive failures by the Red Cross to act on its reconstruction goals, particularly the construction of new permanent housing. Though the organization claimed to have provided shelter to 132,000 Haitians, the reporters were able to verify the existence of only six permanent structures. The other homes cited by the Red Cross were either temporary shacks or damaged homes that had been retrofitted. The report heavily criticized the Red Cross’s lack of transparency regarding how funds had been allocated, citing internal documents that suggested that Red Cross staffers lacked the expertise to determine where substantial amounts of money ought best to be spent. It further asserted that oversight of many reconstruction projects ostensibly managed by the Red Cross had been delegated to other NGOs, thereby diverting substantial monies into administrative costs. Red Cross officials countered that hazy land-ownership laws in Haiti had complicated the erection of permanent housing and that subsidizing interim housing was often more realistic. The organization also contested the allegations of excessive overhead costs, claiming that its spending was similar to that of other organizations working in the region.

In August 2014 the United States enacted the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, which mandated the establishment of a three-year plan for meeting reconstruction benchmarks in Haiti and the provision of annual reports to the U.S. Congress by the State Department.