A second distinction of trade unionism in western Europe emerged in the area of managerial prerogative. Since many continental industries started at new sites and on a large scale, they were less burdened with a legacy of local management and craft autonomy than were British enterprises. Because of the more unitary and centralized organization of European firms, a distinction between management and labour and the right of management to manage were from the beginning more securely established, and shop-floor contestation between management and labour over the organization of the labour process became much less central to European than to British and American industrial relations. Representing both unskilled and skilled workers in large establishments, western European industrial unions were never committed to defending job demarcations among skilled and between skilled and unskilled workers. This enabled especially the more politically powerful union movements to accept managerial prerogative and high flexibility in internal labour markets. In fact, their lack of commitment to any specific division of labour on the shop floor later enabled European unions to support and promote comprehensive public and private labour-market policies of general upgrading of skills and jobs. And while effective centralized control over the shop floor was ceded to management from the beginning, that control was later available to share with politically powerful unions if and when these were willing to seek legislation on “industrial democracy.” “Cooperative” union participation in management then became possible, because industrial unions had no history of resisting large-scale organization as such, were not beholden to any particular group of workers, and had no principal interest in curtailing firms’ internal flexibility.

A third defining characteristic of trade-union history in western Europe is in the area of political power. Unable to afford the laissez-faire liberalism of Victorian Britain, European states early on took an active role in the regulation of labour markets, often siding with capital in support of rapid accumulation. At a time when the doctrines of voluntarism and state abstention became established in British industrial relations, unions were regarded by European ruling elites as a threat to both national unity and economic progress. In these circumstances, “pure-and-simple” unionism was impossible. European unions had little choice but to define themselves as political movements—at least until conditions for independent, economic unionism had been created—and in fact they typically started out as industrial arms of political parties, usually socialist or Roman Catholic. Where political unionism was of the Roman Catholic kind, it aimed at establishing an autonomous space for cooperative industrial self-governance of workers and employers, free from interference by the modern nation-state. Where the guiding political doctrine was Socialist or, after 1917, Communist, the objective was to gain control over the state in order to use its growing interventionist capacities for fundamental social transformation in the interest of workers. Finally, where political unionism was syndicalist or anarchist, its ultimate goal was to replace the state with a political organization based on the workplace and on relations between associated producers.

Just as craft unionism gives rise to fragmentation by occupation, so political unionism may breed fragmentation along party lines, and by the end of the 19th century almost all continental European union movements outside Scandinavia were ideologically divided. In order to overcome these divisions, unions had to extricate themselves from the control of allied political parties, and European industrial-political unionism became most powerful where unions managed to escape political division, overcome it to form unified organizations, or coordinate their policies. Where organizational unity was accomplished, it enabled political unionism to become an independent economic and political force, continuing universalist traditions of comprehensive social reform without being subservient to any particular party or government strategy. Especially in northern and northwestern Europe, unions became established participants in national politics, functioning in a wide variety of policy areas as recognized quasi-public or para-governmental intermediary institutions.