Postwar politics and government
Defeat and the hardships of war broke the hold of Bulgaria’s traditional parties on the government. In the first two postwar elections, the Agrarians, communists, and socialists together polled first 59 percent and then 65 percent of the ballots. These parties were not united, however, and a communist-led general strike in the winter of 1919–20 was ruthlessly put down by Stamboliyski, who became prime minister first in coalition with smaller conservative parties and then as head of an all-Agrarian cabinet.
Programs of the Agrarian Union
The years from 1920 to 1923 represented a remarkable period in which the Agrarian Union sought to translate into reality the beliefs and ideas developed in its years in opposition. The Agrarian government introduced a progressive income tax and a land reform directed against the country’s few large estates and against absentee ownership, sponsored the spread of cooperative organizations in agriculture and other branches of the economy, and undertook a massive expansion of the school system, providing for, among other things, free, obligatory secondary education. The Agrarians also introduced the practice of obligatory labour service, by which all young men were required to contribute a year’s labour on state projects in lieu of military conscription. The Agrarian government, however, exhibited authoritarian characteristics, which disturbed the majority of the nation.
Stamboliyski’s foreign policy
Stamboliyski abandoned the traditional Bulgarian goal of territorial expansion, which had required huge military budgets, maintaining a standing army and professional officer corps, and the patronage of the great powers. His policy aimed, above all, to cultivate good relations with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes by accepting the status quo in Macedonia.
Stamboliyski’s policies alienated the old political leaders, the Military League (comprising active and reserve officers), and Tsar Boris’s court. The rightist parties united in the National Alliance (later called Democratic Alliance) and planned to march on Sofia to wrest control of the country. On the left, the communists viewed the Agrarian government as their principal opponent. But the most dangerous enemies were the Military League and Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).
IMRO established effective control over the Pirin region and launched terrorist attacks across the border into Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia. It also assassinated several Agrarian leaders. Unable to rely on the Bulgarian military against the Macedonian terrorists, Stamboliyski turned to Yugoslavia (as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was soon to be known): by signing the Treaty of Niš, he permitted Yugoslav forces to pursue the Macedonian guerrilla bands into Bulgarian territory.
This treaty, the pressures of dictatorial rule, and an overwhelming Agrarian election victory in early 1923 led Stamboliyski’s opponents to plan a coup d’état. It was organized by the Military League, IMRO, and the old parties, and it probably had the support of Tsar Boris III. When the coup was launched on the night of June 8–9, 1923, it took the Agrarian government by surprise. Stamboliyski was captured a few days later and brutally murdered, and a right-wing government under Aleksandŭr Tsankov took over.
Communist uprising
The Bulgarian communists, who had declared their neutrality when the coup occurred, were chastised by Moscow and directed to prepare an armed revolt against the Tsankov regime. The communists’ September Uprising was ruthlessly suppressed and provided Tsankov with a pretext for outlawing the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1924, though the party would surface briefly again under another name and continued to operate underground for two decades.
The communists struck back in 1925 with a series of terrorist acts, culminating in an attempt to assassinate the tsar and leaders of the government by blowing up Sofia’s Sveta Nedelya Cathedral during services. Although 123 people were killed and hundreds more wounded, the main targets escaped, and the government exacted brutal reprisals.
In the wake of the defeats suffered in 1923 and 1925, the communist leaders escaped abroad, finding positions in the Soviet Union or the Comintern (Communist International). One of them, Georgi Dimitrov, achieved international fame as the chief defendant in the Reichstag fire trial of 1933. Following Dimitrov’s acquittal, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had him appointed secretary-general of the Comintern, a position he held until that body was dissolved in 1943.
Attempts to stabilize government
After 1925 Bulgarian political life began a slow recovery. In January 1926 Tsankov yielded the premiership to the more moderate Andrei Liapchev. A gradual and qualified return to a free press and parliamentary politics marked his five-year tenure, although terrorist acts by IMRO continued and soured Bulgaria’s relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. In 1931 a reconstituted opposition called the Popular Bloc, a coalition that included the moderate wing of the Agrarian Union, defeated the Democratic Alliance.
Coming to power during the Great Depression, the Popular Bloc government was unable to alleviate the dire economic situation and stem a rising tide of labour unrest. On the night of May 18–19, 1934, the Military League carried out a peaceful coup d’état that installed as prime minister Kimon Georgiev, a participant in the 1923 coup. Similar to Italian fascism, the ideology of the new regime was supplied by an elitist group called Zveno (“A Link in a Chain”), which drew its membership from intellectual, commercial, and military circles. Zveno advocated “national restoration” through an authoritarian, nonpartisan regime. The “divisive forces” associated with parliamentary politics were eliminated by the suspension of the constitution and the suppression of all political parties. A new assembly was created, composed of individuals without party affiliation and elected from approved government lists.
The new regime was able to suppress IMRO and restore the government’s authority over Pirin Macedonia, but its political base was too narrow to allow it to consolidate power firmly. The real beneficiary of the 1934 coup was Tsar Boris III. By the end of 1935, he had filled the power vacuum. He used his own clique in the army to unseat and jail Georgiev, purged the Military League, and, by November 1935, installed a subservient government under Georgi Kyoseivanov. The relative weight of parliament was considerably diminished, and the government approximated a royal-military dictatorship, the form of government that had become prominent in eastern Europe.