Ethnic relations and Russia’s “near-abroad”

Post-Soviet Russia emerged with formidable ethnic problems. Many of the autonomous ethnic regions that were part of the empire—formed before 1917—no longer wished to be under Russian hegemony, and ethnic Russians comprised less than four-fifths of the population of the Russian Federation. Inevitably, the question of ethnic identity emerged. The term rossiyanin was used to designate a citizen of the Russian Federation and was not given any ethnic Russian connotation. Yeltsin established a committee to construct a Russian identity and national idea that could be used to rally people around the new Russian Federation. The committee failed after several years of attempts, finding that a national idea and identity needed to come from below and not from above, since history had shown that the creation of an identity from above leads to the establishment or strengthening of an authoritarian or totalitarian state. The Russian Orthodox Church reestablished itself as a force in the moral guidance of reborn Russia, but there were many other religions among the minority groups, particularly Islam. Russia continued to face problems associated with governing a multiethnic state within a democratic framework.

During the Yeltsin years, Russia’s numerous administrative regions sought greater autonomy. For example, Tatarstan negotiated additional rights and privileges, and the republic of Chechnya declared independence in 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chechen nationalism was based on the struggle against Russian imperialism since the early 19th century and the living memory of Stalin’s massive deportations of the Chechen population in 1944 that had resulted in the deaths of a large segment of the population. In late 1994 Yeltsin sent the army into Chechnya in the aftermath of a botched Russian-orchestrated coup against the secessionist president, Dzhokhar Dudayev. There were fears that if Chechnya succeeded in breaking away from the Russian Federation, other republics might follow suit. Moreover, Dudayev’s Chechnya had become a source of drug dealing and arms peddling. In 1995 Russia gained control of the capital, Grozny. However, in 1996 Russian forces were pushed out of the capital city. Yeltsin, faced with an upcoming presidential election and great unpopularity because of both the war and economic problems, had Gen. Aleksandr Lebed sign a cease-fire agreement with the Chechens. The Russians subsequently withdrew from the republic, postponing the question of Chechen independence.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established to serve as a forum for the former Soviet republics. All the former republics eventually joined, except the Baltic republics. Moscow coined the term “the near-abroad” when discussing its foreign policy toward the newly independent states. Russia still hoped to maintain influence over most of these former republics, and it considered both the Caucasus and Central Asia its special area of interest, raising fears that Moscow would use the CIS as a mechanism for achieving this aim. Aid from the Russian government to Russian separatists in the Dniester region of Moldova and intervention in the Tajik civil war were illustrative of Moscow’s attempt to maintain influence in these areas. In addition, the Russian government was prepared to use other means of exerting influence, such as economic pressure on Ukraine and the threat of separatism in Georgia, to attain its ends.

However, Moscow did more to undermine the CIS through its inconsistent policies, lack of organizational leadership, and tendency to work bilaterally with the governments of the newly independent republics. At CIS meetings many announcements were made about closer integration among the member states, and a plethora of documents were signed, but very little was done. In 1996 Russia and Belarus began a process that, it was proclaimed, would eventually result in the unification of the two countries. However, by the early 21st century there was still no sign that unification would occur. Given Russia’s severe economic difficulties, which limited its ability to provide financial and military assistance to its neighbours (at least until the surge in oil prices in the early 21st century), it found it difficult to retain influence over its near-abroad. Even regarding access to Russia’s markets by its neighbours, Russian officials were wary of allowing too many goods to flow into the country for fear that it would further weaken Russian industry.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left some 30 million Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation. The largest Russian populations were in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Baltic countries. Governments in these countries feared that Moscow could, if it wanted, use the Russian populations there to pressure the governments to adopt policies friendly to Moscow. However, during the 1990s Moscow refrained from following such an approach—sometimes to the great criticism of the Russians living in these areas.

Foreign affairs

For several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin placed a high priority on relations with the West, particularly with the United States. The initial honeymoon period in U.S.-Russian relations ended abruptly, as it became increasingly clear that some geopolitical goals of each country were incompatible. Russia opposed the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Russia eventually accepted the inevitability of NATO expansion to some countries, the government tried to thwart the entry of former Soviet republics and to construct a viable bilateral relationship with NATO so that it would have some influence over the organization’s decisions. While Moscow was still wary of NATO, it attempted to strengthen its economic and political relations with the European Union (EU). Policy disagreements over the Balkans—in particular, U.S. support for armed intervention against the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Milošević—also contributed to the cooling of relations between Washington and Moscow.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole superpower. As a result, the Russian government tried to not only come to terms with the loss of empire and superpower status but also create a foreign policy doctrine reflecting the new global geopolitical reality. Russia’s increasing concern with U.S. hegemony in the world system became a constant theme in Russian foreign policy, especially after Yevgeny Primakov became foreign minister in 1995. Primakov stressed the need for a multipolar system of international relations to replace the unipolar world dominated by the United States. In an attempt to counter U.S. power, Moscow strengthened its political and military relations with China and India, although friction between New Delhi and Beijing made it unlikely that a strong trilateral alliance would emerge to challenge the United States. Russia’s relations with Iran and differences in approaches to Iraq further increased tensions in Russian-U.S. relations.

During the Yeltsin years the normal foreign-policy-making mechanisms did not perform well, as various bureaucratic bodies fought for control over the direction of Russia’s external relations. Moreover, Yeltsin himself exhibited inconsistency in his foreign policy; his divide-and-rule strategy was an effective barrier to the establishment of greater order in Russia’s foreign relations, though Primakov attempted to give some direction to Russia’s foreign policy. Consequently, Russian foreign policy during this period was characterized by aimlessness, contradictions, and confusion.

Rewriting history

The Yeltsin period witnessed changes in Russian historiography. During the Soviet period, history was written on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, which placed class struggle and the inevitable emergence of communism at the centre of history. With the collapse of the Soviet Union—and with it Marxist-Leninist dogma—Russian historians began to reevaluate the historiography of the Soviet and tsarist periods. They were aided by the opening of archives in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Historians engaged in serious debate as to whether the events of 1917 were inevitable or not. The belief that the Bolshevik Revolution had thrown Russia off the evolutionary course traveled by other European countries gained wide acceptance. Popular histories began to glorify the tsarist period, and Peter I, Catherine II, Alexander II, and others became positive figures in Russian history. Nicholas II was viewed more sympathetically, with emphasis placed on his great love for his family and Russia. The reburial of his remains and those of the immediate imperial family, all of whom were executed together in 1918, in the Peter-Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg in 1999 brought to a head the partial transformation of Nicholas II’s position in Russian history. The opening of the archives also gave historians an unprecedented opportunity to rewrite the history of the Soviet period. The Stalin period and the role of Lenin in the emergence of a totalitarian state after the revolution were the first targets of this new history. Documentary evidence reflecting thinking at the highest levels during and after World War II also gave historians an opportunity to reevaluate the origins of the Cold War, which in many instances led to debunking conventional wisdom among Western historians of Soviet intentions at the time.