Britain since 1945

Labour and the welfare state (1945–51)

Labour rejoiced at its political triumph, the first independent parliamentary majority in the party’s history, but it faced grave problems. The war had stripped Britain of virtually all its foreign financial resources, and the country had built up “sterling credits”—debts owed to other countries that would have to be paid in foreign currencies—amounting to several billion pounds. Moreover, the economy was in disarray. Some industries, such as aircraft manufacture, were far larger than was now needed, while others, such as railways and coal mines, were desperately short of new equipment and in bad repair. With nothing to export, Britain had no way to pay for imports or even for food. To make matters worse, within a few weeks of the surrender of Japan, on September 2, 1945, U.S. President Harry S. Truman, as he was required to do by law, ended lend-lease, upon which Britain had depended for its necessities as well as its arms. John Maynard Keynes, as his last service to Great Britain, had to negotiate a $3.75 billion loan from the United States and a smaller one from Canada. In international terms, Britain was bankrupt.

Labour, nonetheless, set about enacting the measures that in some cases had been its program since the beginning of the century. Nationalization of railroads and coal mines, which were in any case so run down that any government would have had to bring them under state control, and of the Bank of England began immediately. In addition, road transport, docks and harbours, and the production of electrical power were nationalized. There was little debate. The Conservatives could hardly argue that any of these industries, barring electric power, was flourishing or that they could have done much differently.

More debate came over Labour’s social welfare legislation, which created the “welfare state.” Labour enacted a comprehensive program of national insurance, based upon the Beveridge Report (prepared by economist William Beveridge and advocating state action to control unemployment, along with the introduction of free health insurance and contributory social insurance) but differing from it in important ways. It regularized the de facto nationalization of public assistance, the old Poor Law, in the National Assistance Act of 1946, and in its most controversial move it established the gigantic framework of the National Health Service, which provided free comprehensive medical care for every citizen, rich or poor. The pugnacious temper of the minister of health, Aneurin Bevan, and the insistence of radical elements in the Labour Party upon the nationalization of all hospitals provoked the only serious debate accompanying the enactment of this immense legislative program, most of which went into force within two years of Labour’s accession to office. Bevan emerged at this time as an important figure on the Labour left and would remain its leader until his death in 1960.

Economic crisis and relief (1947)

Labour’s record in its first 18 months of office was distinguished. In terms of sheer legislative bulk, the government accomplished more than any other government in the 20th century save perhaps Asquith’s pre-World War I administration or the administration of Margaret Thatcher (1979–90). Yet by 1947 it had been overtaken by the economic crisis, which had not abated. The loan from the United States that was supposed to last four years was nearly gone. Imports were cut to the bone. Bread, never rationed during the war, had to be controlled. Britain had to withdraw support from Greece and Turkey, reversing a policy more than a century old, and call upon the United States to take its place. Thus, at Britain’s initiative, the Truman Doctrine came into existence.

Relief came with U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s announcement that the United States would undertake a massive program of financial aid to the European continent. Any country in the Eastern or Western bloc was entitled to take part. Although the Soviet Union immediately denounced the Marshall Plan as the beginning of a division between the East and the West, all western European countries, including Britain, hastened to participate. It can be argued that the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine represent the permanent involvement of the United States in Europe.

Withdrawal from the empire

Britain, not entirely by coincidence, was also beginning its withdrawal from the empire. Most insistent in its demand for self-government was India. The Indian independence movement had come of age during World War I and had gained momentum with the Massacre of Amritsar of 1919. The All-India Congress Party, headed by Mohandas K. Gandhi, evoked sympathy throughout the world with its policy of nonviolent resistance, forcing Baldwin’s government in the late 1920s to seek compromise. The eventual solution, embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, provided responsible government for the Indian provinces, the Indianization of the civil service, and an Indian parliament, but it made clear that the Westminster Parliament would continue to legislate for the subcontinent. The act pleased no one, neither the Indians, the Labour Party, which considered it a weak compromise, nor a substantial section of the Conservative Party headed by Churchill, which thought it went too far. Agitation in India continued.

Further British compromise became inevitable when the Japanese in the spring of 1942 swept through Burma to the eastern borders of India while also organizing in Singapore a large Indian National Army and issuing appeals to Asian nationalism. During the war, Churchill reluctantly offered increasing installments of independence amounting to dominion status in return for all-out Indian support for the conflict. These offers were rejected by both the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority.

The election of a Labour government at the end of World War II coincided with the rise of sectarian strife within India. The new administration determined with unduly urgent haste that Britain would have to leave India. This decision was announced on June 3, 1947, and British administration in India ended 10 weeks later, on August 15. Burma (now Myanmar) and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) received independence by early 1948. Britain, in effect, had no choice but to withdraw from colonial territories it no longer had the military and economic power to control.

The same circumstances that dictated the withdrawal from India required, at almost the same time, the termination of the mandate in Trans-Jordan, the evacuation of all of Egypt except the Suez Canal territory, and in 1948 the withdrawal from Palestine, which coincided with the proclamation of the State of Israel. It has been argued that the orderly and dignified ending of the British Empire, beginning in the 1940s and stretching into the 1960s, was Britain’s greatest international achievement. However, like the notion of national unity during World War II, this interpretation can also be seen largely as a myth produced by politicians and the press at the time and perpetuated since. The ending of empire was calculated upon the basis of Britain’s interests rather than those of its colonies. National interest was framed in terms of the postwar situation—that is, of an economically exhausted, dependent Britain, now increasingly caught up in the international politics of the Cold War. What later became known as “decolonization” was very often shortsighted, self-interested, and not infrequently bloody, as was especially the case in Malaysia (where the politics of anticommunism played a central role) and in Kenya.

Conservative government (1951–64)

The last years of Attlee’s administration were troubled by economic stringency and inflation. The pound was sharply devalued in 1949, and a general election on February 23, 1950, reduced Labour’s majority over the Conservative and Liberal parties to only five seats. Attlee himself was in poor health, and Ernest Bevin, formerly the most politically powerful man in the cabinet, had died. More-radical members of the party, led by Aneurin Bevan, were growing impatient with the increasingly moderate temper of the leadership. On October 25, 1951, a second general election in a House of Commons not yet two years old returned the Conservatives under Churchill to power with a majority of 17 seats.

The Conservatives remained in power for the next 13 years, from October 1951 until October 1964, first under Churchill—who presided over the accession of the new monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, on February 6, 1952, but was forced to resign on account of age and health on April 5, 1955—and then under Churchill’s longtime lieutenant and foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. Eden resigned in January 1957, partly because of ill health but chiefly because of his failed attempt to roll back the retreat from empire by a reoccupation of the Suez Canal Zone after the nationalization of the canal by the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the summer of 1956. This belated experiment in imperial adventure drew wide criticism from the United States, the British dominions, and indeed within Britain itself. Although it was cut short in December 1956, when UN emergency units supplanted British (and French) troops, the Suez intervention divided British politics as few foreign issues have done since. Eden was succeeded by his chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan. Macmillan remained in office until October 1963, when he too retired because of ill health, to be succeeded by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then foreign secretary. In this period of single-party government, the themes were economic change and the continued retreat from colonialism.

Labour interlude (1964–70)

The long Conservative tenure came to an end on October 16, 1964, with the appointment of a Labour administration headed by Harold Wilson, who had been Labour leader only a little more than a year and a half—since the death of the widely admired Hugh Gaitskell. Gaitskell and prominent Conservative R.A. Butler had been the principal figures in the politics of moderation known as “Butskellism” (derived by combining their last names), a slightly left-of-centre consensus predicated on the recognition of the power of trade unionism, the importance of addressing the needs of the working class, and the necessity of collaboration between social classes. Although Wilson was thought to be a Labour radical and had attracted a substantial party following on this account, he was in fact a moderate. His government inherited the problems that had accumulated during the long period of Conservative prosperity: poor labour productivity, a shaky pound, and trade union unrest. His prescription for improvement included not only a widely heralded economic development plan, to be pursued with the introduction of the most modern technology, but also stern and unpopular controls on imports, the devaluation of the pound, wage restraint, and an attempt, in the event these measures proved unsuccessful, to reduce the power of the trade unions. Eventually the Wilson government became unpopular and was kept in power primarily by weakness and division in the Conservative Party. Finally, in 1968, Wilson was confronted with an outbreak of civil rights agitation in Northern Ireland that quickly degenerated into armed violence.

The return of the Conservatives (1970–74)

The Conservatives returned in a general election on June 18, 1970, with a majority of 32. The new prime minister, Edward Heath, set three goals: to take Britain into the European Economic Community (EEC; ultimately succeeded by the European Union [EU]), to restore economic growth, and to break the power of the trade unions. In his short term in office he succeeded only in negotiating Britain’s entry into the EEC, in 1973. In fact, Heath was defeated by the trade unions, which simply boycotted his industrial legislation, and by the Arab oil embargo, which began in 1973 and which made a national coal miners’ strike in the winter of 1973–74 particularly effective. Heath used the strongest weapon available to a prime minister—a general election, on February 28, 1974—to settle the issue of who governed Britain. The election, held when factories were in operation only three days a week and civilian Britain was periodically reduced to candlelight, was a repudiation of the policy of confrontation with labour.

Labour back in power (1974–79)

Despite losing by more than 200,000 votes to the Conservatives, Labour and Wilson returned as a minority government and promptly made peace by granting the miners’ demands. Wilson’s policies were confirmed on October 10, 1974, in a second election, when his tiny majority, based upon cooperation from the Scottish National Party and the Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalist Party) as well as the Liberals, was increased to an almost workable margin of 20. The Labour government faced severe economic challenges—including post-World War II record levels of unemployment and inflation—yet Wilson was able to renegotiate British membership in the EEC, which was confirmed in a referendum in June 1975. However, neither Wilson nor James Callaghan, who succeeded him on April 5, 1976, was able to come to terms with the labour unions, which were as willing to embarrass a Labour government as a Conservative one. Labour’s parliamentary position was precarious, and the party lost its governing majority through a series of by-election defeats and defections. Labour survived through what became known as the “Lib-Lab Pact,” an agreement between Callaghan and Liberal Party leader David Steel, which lasted until August 1978. Union unrest, induced by rapidly increasing prices, made the late 1970s a period of almost endless industrial conflict, culminating at the end of 1978 in the “Winter of Discontent,” a series of bitter disputes, which the government seemed unable to control and which angered the voters. Meanwhile, Labour’s slender majority in the House of Commons eroded with the defection of the Liberal and nationalist parties following the defeat of referenda in Wales and Scotland that would have created devolved assemblies. On March 28, 1979, Callaghan was forced from office after losing a vote of confidence in the House of Commons by a single vote (310–311), the first such dismissal of a prime minister since MacDonald in 1924.