The Ruhr and inflation
During these immediate postwar years the value of the mark steadily deteriorated. This was due to a number of factors, among them reparation payments, the flight of German capital abroad, obstacles to the revival of German foreign trade, and a consequent adverse balance of payments. Faced with budgetary deficits, the German government followed a practice already begun during the war: issuing more money to meet its expenses. The result was runaway inflation that was more severe than in any other country of postwar Europe. This process was well under way in 1922, when the exchange rate of the mark to the dollar (pre-1914 relation: 4.20 marks = $1) fell from 162 marks to more than 7,000 marks. The culmination of the inflation, however, came in 1923, the year that also saw the climax in the protracted crisis of internal disorder and disunity.
The occupation of the Ruhr by French troops in January 1923 soon led to what was virtually a state of undeclared war between the French and the Germans in the Rhineland. The coalition government formed by Wilhelm Cuno (Centre, People’s Party, and Democrats), which had succeeded that of Wirth in November 1922, ordered passive resistance to French and Belgian attempts to get the mines and factories working and a ban on all reparation deliveries. The occupation forces responded with mass arrests, deportations, and an economic blockade that cut off not only the Ruhr but also the greater part of the occupied Rhineland from the rest of Germany. This was a most serious blow to the German economy in view of the economic dependence of the rest of the country on the west, especially after the loss of Upper Silesia. The Germans in the Ruhr ultimately resorted to sabotage and guerrilla warfare.
The blockade enforced by the French dislocated the whole economic life of Germany and sent the currency into a free fall. The mark depreciated to 160,000 to the dollar on July 1; 242,000,000 to the dollar on October 1; and 4,200,000,000,000 to the dollar on November 20, 1923. Commercial dealings were replaced by barter, and food riots broke out. The middle classes and pensioners saw their savings completely wiped out, and the drop in real wages devastated the working classes. Many businessmen and industrialists made large profits, however.
Threats of disintegration and civil war
The extremist parties hastened to exploit the economic crisis. In Saxony and Thuringia the Communists and the Social Democrats in the Land governments intended to carry out a seizure of power (October 1923). That same month a Communist-led uprising occurred in Hamburg. At the same time, the Land government in Bavaria openly defied the orders of the Reich government, and Hitler and the small National Socialist movement were urging the Munich authorities to stage a march on Berlin.
In August 1923 the Cuno government had been forced to resign in the face of a Social Democratic demand for a stronger policy. A new ministry was formed by Gustav Stresemann with the support of the People’s Party, the Centre, the Democrats, and (until November) the Social Democrats. On September 26 Stresemann called off the campaign of passive resistance in the Rhineland, ordered the immediate resumption of work in the occupied areas, and lifted the ban on reparation deliveries. A state of emergency was declared under Article 48 of the constitution, and the army was used to suppress the danger of a Communist coup in Saxony and Thuringia. The Hamburg rising was put down by the police, and the Reich government threatened drastic action if the Bavarian authorities did not fall into line. In a last effort to force the hand of the Bavarian government, Hitler attempted to stage a putsch in Munich on November 8–9 without success. The Munich authorities were glad enough to make their peace with Berlin, but the criminal trials of Hitler and the other putsch plotters were farcical in their leniency.