2012 coup and warfare in the north

Dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the conflict in the north was cited as the impetus for an army mutiny on March 21, 2012, that quickly evolved into a military coup. Early the next day the mutinying group announced that it had seized power and suspended the constitution, replacing Mali’s democratically elected government with the National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and Restoration of the State, headed by Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo. The coup was quickly criticized by the international community, including the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Within a week of the coup, both organizations suspended Mali, and in early April they imposed sanctions on the junta and Mali, which quickly led to food and energy shortages and rising prices.

Meanwhile, Tuareg rebels and Islamic insurgents—some of whom had ties to AQIM—took advantage of the political instability and by April 1 had gained control over the northern half of the country, including the strategically important town of Gao, home to a military base, and the historic city of Timbuktu. On April 6, 2012, the Tuareg rebel group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad; MNLA) declared that the northern part of Mali was now the independent state of Azawad. The MNLA’s declaration of independence was promptly condemned by the international community. Later that day, with the impact of the sanctions as well as the rapidly deteriorating situation in the north weighing heavily, the junta agreed to a deal mediated by ECOWAS that would restore civilian rule to Mali. In return, the sanctions were lifted. As part of the agreement, Touré officially resigned from the presidency on April 8, clearing the way for the presidential succession plan mandated in the constitution to be enacted. Consequently, the president of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, was sworn in as interim president of Mali on April 12, 2012. Traoré’s appointment was not well received by all Malians, however, and in May he was beaten into unconsciousness by a mob of junta supporters who had launched a brazen attack on the presidential palace. He recuperated in France for two months before returning to Mali in late July. Under pressure from ECOWAS to form a more inclusive—and presumably more stable—government, Traoré reappointed his prime minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, in August, and a new government was formed later that month.

During Traoré’s absence, the situation in the self-declared state of Azawad grew even more precarious. An alliance that was announced in late May between the MNLA and the primary Islamist group, Ansar Dine (“Defenders of the Faith”), would have caused the north to be ruled as an Islamic state, but the alliance quickly broke down over Ansar Dine’s insistence on imposing a strict version of Sharīʿah law in the region, which had traditionally embraced a more liberal and tolerant version of Islam. By early July, Ansar Dine and other Islamist groups, including AQIM and an offshoot known as Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, had wrested control of much of the territory from the MNLA—including the main towns of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal—and had begun imposing Sharīʿah law on northern Malians. In addition, the Islamists had begun damaging or destroying many Sufi religious shrines of great historical and cultural value; they claimed that the monuments were idolatrous. Ansar Dine’s leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, repudiated the MNLA’s claim of independence for Azawad, stating that Ansar Dine members considered themselves Malian, opposed dividing the country, and wanted to impose Sharīʿah law throughout the entire country, not just in the contested northern territory. By midsummer the grave situation in the north had caused hundreds of thousands of Malians to flee the region.

In early December, representatives from the Malian government, Ansar Dine, and the MNLA met with ECOWAS officials to discuss an end to the protracted crisis. Both rebel groups agreed in principle to respect national unity and human rights, while rejecting forms of terrorism and extremism, and to observe a cease-fire, and all parties agreed to continue talks at a later date. In the months prior to the meeting, as the various Islamist groups strengthened their foothold in the north, the international community grew concerned that the region was becoming a haven for terrorist groups and debated about what course of action to take to assist Mali in its efforts to reclaim the territory. Options included bolstering Mali’s military capabilities by providing training and support and deploying an international military force to retake the contested region. However, many members of Mali’s military, including the members of the junta responsible for the March coup, were resistant to the idea of foreign troops on Malian soil.

On December 10, 2012, Diarra, one of the Malian politicians who supported plans for foreign intervention in the north, was arrested by soldiers from the junta. The next day they forced him to resign as prime minister; they alleged that Diarra was on the verge of committing acts of subversion. Later that day Traoré appointed Django Cissoko, a seasoned public official, as the new interim prime minister. The military’s interference in political affairs was widely condemned by the international community. Later that month the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an international force, led by African troops, to help Mali reclaim the northern part of the country. Deployment of the UN-backed force, known as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), was not expected to occur until well into 2013.

The time frame for international assistance was moved up, however, when Islamist fighters led a southerly incursion and captured Konna, a key town in the centre of the country, in early January 2013. Alarmed by the fighters’ advance into government-held territory, Malian officials asked for international assistance in the matter, and the UN called for swift action. France quickly sent troops that—together with the Malian forces and later with troops from other African countries, under the AFISMA banner—utilized both air strikes and ground combat to force the Islamist fighters to retreat from Konna and beyond. By the end of January, the Malian, French, and AFISMA troops had retaken key towns in the north, including Timbuktu, and by early February had pushed Islamist fighters from Kidal, the last town under their control. Routed from their strongholds, Islamist fighters embraced guerrilla-style tactics against international and Malian troops in the north. French troops began to withdraw from Mali in April, and later that month the UN Security Council approved the creation of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which took over operations from AFISMA in July 2013. MINUSMA troops then worked alongside the remaining French forces to maintain security.

Meanwhile, a peace accord was signed in June 2013 by the Mali government and Tuareg rebels. It provided for an immediate cease-fire and for the return of Malian troops to the town of Kidal, which had been held by Tuareg rebels after the Islamist fighters were pushed out earlier in the year. The agreement was intended to provide an environment conducive to elections, which were expected to be held later that summer.

In spite of concerns that the country was not yet ready to hold elections, the polls were held on July 28, 2013, with more than two dozen candidates standing for the presidency. Election day was peaceful, and a record number of voters—more than 50 percent—turned out to cast their ballots. Provisional results showed that no candidate received a majority of the vote, so the top two vote getters, former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and former finance minister Soumaïla Cissé, faced each other in a second round of voting, held on August 11. Keïta was victorious, winning almost 78 percent of the vote, and Cissé conceded defeat. Traoré handed power over to Keïta, who was sworn in on September 4, 2013.

Although some strides were made in the area of economic growth, violence continued to plague the northern part of the country, either waged by Islamist militants battling government forces or citizens or because of infighting among Tuareg rebels. The country also experienced attacks farther south, such as the siege of a hotel in the town of Sevare in central Mali that saw at least a dozen people killed in August 2015. In southern Mali an attack on a hotel in Bamako in November 2015 left more than 20 people dead. As the government battled with insurgents for control of parts of the country, there came troubling reports of abuses by Malian troops. There was also an uptick in fighting between various ethnic groups.

2018 presidential election

The country’s increasing problems with violence and security overshadowed the 2018 presidential election, which was scheduled to take place in July. Two dozen candidates stood in the election, including the incumbent, Keïta, and his primary 2013 challenger, Cissé. When the election was held on July 29, security issues prevented voting from taking place in more than 600 polling stations (less than 4 percent of all stations). Keïta and Cissé received the most votes in the poll, with Keïta receiving more than 41 percent and Cissé almost 18 percent. Since no one candidate won more than 50 percent, a runoff election was scheduled. Cissé challenged the results of the first round at the country’s Constitutional Court, including in his complaint claims that ballot boxes had been stuffed and electoral law had been violated, but the court upheld the results.

The runoff election was held on August 12, 2018. Security was again a concern, and, in spite of thousands of troops being deployed to serve as additional protection, almost 500 polling stations were unable to open, and many eligible voters were deterred by fears of violence, contributing to a low turnout. Keïta was declared the winner, with about 67 percent of the vote. Cissé again alleged that fraudulent activity had occurred and rejected the results. Some international observer groups stated that they did not see evidence of fraud but admitted that they had observed some irregularities.

2020 and 2021 coups and transitional administration

Security problems continued to plague Mali during Keïta’s second term, which contributed to growing frustration among the populace with his administration. A weak economy and allegations of corruption also fed the discontent. National Assembly elections, repeatedly postponed due to insecurity, were finally held in March and April 2020. Underscoring the precarious security situation was the kidnapping in March of Cissé while he was campaigning for the elections. On April 30, the Constitutional Court overturned the provisional results for some 30 seats, which then resulted in an increase in the number of seats won by Keïta’s party; this kicked off months of protests by a coalition of opposition groups that came to be known as the 5 June Movement–Rally of Patriotic Forces (Mouvement du 5 Juin–Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques; M5-RFP, or M5). ECOWAS made attempts to mediate the crisis but was not successful.

On August 18, 2020, troops marched to Bamako and arrested Keïta, the prime minister, and other senior officials. Hours later, Keïta announced that he was resigning. He also dissolved the government and National Assembly. A military junta, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité National pour le Salut du Peuple; CNSP), assumed control. The coup, while cheered by many in Mali, was met with regional and international condemnation.

ECOWAS-led negotiations regarding the creation of a transitional government soon commenced. In mid-September the structure and parameters of the transitional government were announced: it would be headed by an interim president and prime minister, was not to exceed 18 months, and would lead to new elections. A 121-member transitional council, drawn from all segments of society, would serve as the legislative body. Bah N’Daw, a retired colonel and former defense minister, was named interim president, and Col. Assimi Goïta, the chairman of the CNSP, was named interim vice president. Because of his role in the coup, and because of the call for a civilian-led transitional administration, Goïta’s appointment was not without controversy. The interim president and vice president were inaugurated on September 25, 2020. N’Daw appointed Moctar Ouane, a veteran diplomat, interim prime minister, and Ouane took office on September 28. In April 2021 the transitional administration announced that a constitutional referendum would be held in October followed by elections in February 2022.

Meanwhile, there was growing criticism of the administration’s pace of progress with constitutional reforms, the role that the military still had in the administration, and the status of salary negotiations with the main trade union. M5 leaders were quite vocal in their displeasure and called for the administration to be dissolved and replaced. In May 2021 the public dissatisfaction led N’Daw to call for a cabinet shuffle so that Ouane could form a more inclusive cabinet. The makeup of the new cabinet, announced on May 24, revealed that, although two portfolios had been taken away from military officers who had participated in the coup, the same portfolios had been reassigned to other military officers. Still, the cabinet shuffle angered the military, which detained Ouane and N’Daw later that day. The next day, Goïta accused N’Daw and Ouane of having violated the terms of the transitional charter agreement by not consulting him about the cabinet changes. On May 26, while still detained, Ouane and N’Daw announced their resignations. Goïta then assumed the interim presidency, the legitimacy of which was affirmed by the Constitutional Court on May 28. The military’s actions, widely considered to have been another coup, were condemned by ECOWAS and the African Union as well as others on the international stage. Nevertheless, Goïta, who pledged to adhere to the timetable for the February 2022 elections, was formally sworn in as interim president on June 7. Later that day, he appointed former minister and prominent M5 leader Choguel Maïga the new interim prime minister.