The ascent to paramountcy

The government of Lord Wellesley

The next governor-general, Lord Mornington (later Richard Colley Wellesley, Marquess Wellesley), combined the convictions of the imperialist group with a mandate to deal with the French. Wellesley was thus able to use this fear of the French as a cover for his imperialism until he was near to complete success. His term of office (1798–1805) was therefore a decisive period in the rise of the British dominion.

Wellesley decided first to strike at Mysore, still a formidable military power and avowedly hostile. He had little difficulty getting the nizam for an ally and securing the neutrality of the peshwa. The nizam, hard pressed by the Marathas, was persuaded to disband his contingent of French-trained troops in return for a promise of protection. This was the first of Wellesley’s subsidiary treaties. Tippu Sultan had entertained French republican envoys and had planted a tree of liberty at Seringapatam, but when the British stormed Seringapatam in May 1799 he was isolated and at bay, and he found too late that concessions, in the Indian tradition, would not save him. Tippu Sultan died fighting in the breach. Wellesley tempered his imperialism with diplomacy by restoring the child head of the old Hindu reigning family as the ruler of half of Tippu Sultan’s dominions; the other half was divided between the nizam and the company. This substantially enlarged the area of the Madras presidency.

For the next three years Wellesley was occupied with certain exercises in realpolitik and with developing his device of the subsidiary treaty. The realpolitik was evidenced in four directions. On the death (1801) of the reigning Carnatic nawab, Wellesley took over his territories, pensioning the new nawab with one-fifth of the revenue. The same fate befell the small but highly cultivated state of Tanjore (1799) and the port city of Surat on a disputed succession.

The biggest of these exercises concerned the Mughal successor state of Avadh in northern India, which had been in treaty relationship with the company since 1765. This rich state had fallen into disorder under the listless though cultured rule of Āṣaf al-Dawlah; on his death in 1797 a succession dispute and an Afghan invasion of the Punjab gave Wellesley a welcome opportunity for interference. He pressed the nawab to disband his troops and increase his payment to the company for his subsidiary force. When the nawab made an offer to abdicate, it was accepted immediately; but, on finding that abdication would mean annexation and not his son’s succession, he withdrew it, and Wellesley treated him as rebellious. In 1801 Wellesley annexed half the state, including the Ganges–Yamuna Doab and almost all of Rohilkhand. Whatever the verdict on the means employed, this move had important consequences. Avadh was isolated, and a jumping-off place was secured for an attack on the northern Marathas. The company was no longer looking for buffer states as shields against attack but for territory that would serve as springboards for offensive action.

This change of attitude applies to Wellesley’s development of the subsidiary system. In the hands of Clive and Hastings, it was a defensive instrument to safeguard the company’s possessions; in the hands of Wellesley, it became an offensive device with which to subject independent states to British control. The essence of the system was that the company undertook to protect a state from external attack in return for control of its foreign relations. For this purpose it provided a subsidiary force of company troops, who were commonly stationed in a cantonment near the state capital. The state paid for this force by means of a subsidy, which was often commuted into ceding territory. In order to protect itself from an external enemy, the state in question bound itself irrevocably to the British power, providing at the heart, as it were, the means of its own coercion should it ever wish to resume independence.

Wellesley first applied this system in 1798 to Hyderabad, when the aging Niẓām ʿAlī Khan was in dire fear of the Marathas. In 1800 the subsidy was compounded for the nizam’s share of the Mysore annexations. The same system was applied to Avadh, when the great annexation of 1801 was said to be on account of the subsidiary force. It was then the turn of the Marathas—one of the few remaining bastions of Indian independence. Had the Maratha chiefs remained united, Wellesley could have accomplished little; the death of the young peshwa released fresh dissensions, however, heightened by the death of the minister Nana Fadnavis in 1800. The chiefs Holkar and Dawlat Rao Sindhia contended for power over the peshwa, Baj Rao II. On Holkar’s success in 1802, Baji Rao fled to Bassein and applied for British aid. Such an opportunity at the centre of Maratha power was not to be missed; there was also the justification that Dawlat Rao Sindhia, in the north, had 40,000 French-trained troops under a French commander. The Treaty of Bassein (December 31, 1802) placed, as it were, a time bomb at the heart of the Maratha confederacy; British troops were stationed at Pune, at the price of a cession of territory, and the peshwa was reduced to dependency on the British. (See Sindhia family; Holkar dynasty.)

This action provoked the Second Maratha War—at first against Dawlat Rao Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsle and then against Holkar. At first the British won resounding victories. Wellesley’s brother Arthur (later Arthur Wellesley, 1st duke of Wellington) defeated the Sindhia-Bhonsle coalition in west-central India, while Lord Lake (Gerard Lake, 1st Viscount Lake) broke up Sindhia’s French army, occupied Delhi, and took the aged emperor Shah ʿĀlam II under protection. Then came a check, however, with the intervention of Holkar using the old Maratha cavalry tactics, forcing the British to retreat, and besieging Delhi. Though Holkar was later defeated, this was the signal for which exasperated directors and a doubting ministry had been waiting. Wellesley was recalled. His race for hegemony had been lost in the last lap. But Wellesley’s work, avowedly imperialistic, made ultimate supremacy inevitable. The Marathas were too broken to reunite, and there was no one to take their place. (See Treaty of Surji-Arjungaon.)

The government of Lord Minto

The next 10 years were an interlude, not a new era. During that period both Sindhia and Holkar plundered the chiefs of Rajasthan, thus preparing them mentally for future British overlordship. Meanwhile, bands of freebooters known as Pindaris raided the Nagpur (home of the Bhonsle dynasty) and Hyderabad states in widening circles and thence entered British territory. These were dispossessed villagers and discarded soldiers—the human flotsam and jetsam of the frequent wars. They had the elusiveness of guerrillas, and they received the tacit countenance of the Maratha princes but not the goodwill of the population, who were their principal victims.

Lord Minto (governor-general 1807–13) was occupied with the revived French danger, which was once again serious with the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) and Napoleon I’s resulting alliance with Russia. To guard against a French-sponsored Russian attack, British missions were sent to Afghanistan, to Persia, and to Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab. The first two proved fruitless, but the Treaty of Amritsar (1809) with Ranjit Singh defined British and Sikh spheres of influence and settled relations for a generation. Minto’s other achievement was the capture of the Île de France (Mauritius) and Java from the French-controlled Dutch; the former island became a colony, and the latter was restored to the Dutch under the peace treaty. One result of this episode was the acquisition of the key point of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819.