The early Turkish sultans

When Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak assumed authority over the Ghūrid possessions in India, he moved from the neighbourhood of Delhi to Lahore. There he set up guard against another of Muḥammad of Ghūr’s slaves, Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz of Ghazna, who also claimed his former master’s Indian possessions. In 1208 Quṭb al-Dīn defeated his rival and captured Ghazna but soon was driven out again. He died in 1210 in a polo accident, having made no effort to extend his Indian conquests, but he had managed to establish the foundation of an Indian Muslim state.

Quṭb al-Dīn was the first ruler in what has become known, perhaps unreasonably, as the Slave dynasty (only he actually attained a freed status after becoming ruler). Slavery was, however, an integral part of the political system. As practiced in eastern Muslim polities of this period, the institution of slavery provided a nucleus of well-trained and loyal military followers (the mamlūks) for important political figures; indeed, one of the principal objects of this form of slavery was to train specialists in warfare and government, usually Turks, whose first loyalty would be to their masters. Slave status was honourable and was a principal avenue to wealth and high position for talented individuals whose origins were outside the ruling group. It has been observed that a slave was a better investment than a son, whose claim was not based upon proved efficiency. Yet, slaves with high qualifications could get out of control, and often slaves or former slaves controlled their masters as much as they were controlled by them. The beneficial results for the sultanate of this type of political interaction were that some men of talent had room to rise within the system and thus were less tempted to tear it down and that the responsibilities of government tended to rest in the hands of capable men, whether or not they were the actual rulers.

The sultans thus not only kept a close watch over the slave market but also commissioned slave merchants as state agents. Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (reigned 1211–36), son-in-law and successor to Aybak, who was himself a mamlūk, sent a merchant to Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tirmiz to purchase young slaves on his behalf.

Consolidation of the sultanate

During his reign, Iltutmish was faced with three problems: defense of his western frontier, control over the Muslim nobles within India, and subjugation of the many Hindu chiefs who still exercised a large measure of independent rule. His relative success in all three areas gives him claim to the title of founder of the independent Delhi sultanate. His reign opened with a factional dispute in which he and his Delhi-based supporters defeated and killed the rival claimant to the throne, Quṭb al-Dīn’s son, and put down a revolt by a portion of the Delhi guards. In the west Iltutmish was passive at first and even accepted investiture from his old rival, Yildiz, but, when Yildiz was driven from Ghazna into the Punjab by the Khwārezm-Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad in 1215, Iltutmish was able to defeat and capture him at Taraori. Iltutmish might have faced a threat himself from the Khwārezm-Shah had it not been for the latter’s conflict with the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan. Again Iltutmish waited while refugees, including the heir to the Khwārezm-Shahī throne, poured into the Punjab and while Nāṣir al-Dīn Qabācha, another of Muḥammad of Ghūr’s former slaves, maintained a perilous hold on Lahore and Multan. Iltutmish’s political talents were pushed to the maximum as he tried desperately to avoid a direct confrontation with the armies of Genghis Khan. He refused aid to the Khwārezm-Shah heir against the Mongols and yet would not attempt to capture him. Fortunately, the Mongols were content to send raiding parties no further than the Salt Range (in the northern Punjab region), which Iltutmish wisely ignored, and eventually the Khwārezm-Shah prince fled from India after causing enormous destruction within Qabācha’s domains. Thus, Iltutmish’s cause was advanced, and in 1228 he was able to drive Qabācha from the Punjabi cities of Multan and Uch and, by establishing his frontier east of the Beas River, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Mongols. He was not able to gain effective control of the western Punjab, however, largely because the area was subject to raids by hill tribes.

In the east in 1225, Iltutmish launched a successful campaign against Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿIwāz Khaljī, one of Bhaktiyār Khaljī’s lieutenants, who had assumed sovereign authority in Lakhnauti (northern Bengal) and was encroaching on the province of Bihar. ʿIwāz Khaljī was defeated and slain in 1226, and in 1229 Iltutmish invaded Bengal and slew Balka, the last of the Khaljī chiefs to claim independent power. Iltutmish’s campaigns in Rajasthan and central and western India were ultimately less successful, although he temporarily captured Ranthambhor (1226), Mandor (Mandawar; 1227), and Gwalior (1231) and plundered Bhilsa and Ujjain in Malwa (1234–35). His generals suffered defeats, however, at the hands of the Cauhans of Bundi, the Caulukyas of Gujarat, and the Candellas (Chandelas) of Narwar.

By 1236, the year Iltutmish died, the Delhi sultanate was established as clearly the largest and most powerful of a number of competing states in north India. Owing to Iltutmish’s able leadership, Delhi was no longer subordinate to Ghazna, nor was it to remain simply a frontier outpost; it was to become, rather, a proud centre of Muslim power and culture in India. Iltutmish made clear, however, to what extent Islam and Islamic law (Sharīʿah) could determine the contour of politics and culture in the overwhelmingly non-Muslim Indian environment. Early in his reign, a party of theologians approached him with the plea that the infidel Hindus be forced, in accordance with Islamic law, to accept Islam or face death. On behalf of the sultan, his wazīr (vizier) told the divines that this was impractical, since the Muslims were as few as grains of salt in a dish of food. Despite the Islamic proscription against women rulers, Iltutmish nominated his daughter Raziyyah (Raziyyat al-Dīn) to be his successor. By refusing shelter to the Muslim Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu (the last Khwārezm-Shah) against the pagan Genghis Khan, he politely asserted that the sultanate in Delhi, even though a sequel to a Central Asian social and political struggle, was no longer to involve itself in the power politics of countries of the Islamic East. Iltutmish legitimated his ambition by obtaining a letter of investiture from the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, whose name appeared in Hindi on the bullion currency so that the people on the streets might perceive the nature of the new regime.

Iltutmish seems to have enjoyed support among his nobles and advisers for his assertion that the legal structure of the state in India should not be based strictly on Islamic law. Gradually, a judicious balance between the dictates of Sharīʿah and the needs of the time emerged as a distinctive feature of the sultanate. The Muslim constituency, however, could not adjust to the idea of being ruled by a woman, and Raziyyah (reigned 1236–40) fairly quickly succumbed to powerful nobles (the Shamsī), who once had been Iltutmish’s slaves.

Still, the new state had enough internal momentum to survive severe factional disputes during the 10 years following Iltutmish’s death, when four of Iltutmish’s children or grandchildren were in turn raised to the throne and deposed. This momentum was maintained largely through the efforts of Iltutmish’s personal slaves, who came to be known as the Forty (Chihilgān), a political faction whose membership was characterized by talent and by loyalty to the family of Iltutmish.

The political situation had changed by 1246, when Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban, a junior member of the Forty, had gained enough power to attain a controlling position within the administration of the newest sultan, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd (reigned 1246–66). Balban, acting first as nāʾib (“deputy”) to the sultan and later as sultan (reigned 1266–87), was the most important political figure of his time. The period was characterized by almost continuous struggles to maintain Delhi’s position against the revived power of the Hindu chiefs (principally Rajputs) and by vigilance against the strife-ridden but still dangerous Mongols in the west. Even in the central regions of the state, sultanate rule was sometimes challenged by discontented Muslim nobles.

During the first 10 years of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd’s reign, Balban’s campaigns against the Hindu chiefs were only partially successful. By 1266, when he assumed the sultanate, his military strategy was to work outward from the capital. First, he cleared the forests of Mewatis (Mina); then he restored order in the Doab and at Oudh (present-day Ayodhya) and suppressed a revolt in the region of the cities of Badaun and Amroha with particular viciousness. Having established the security of his home territory, Balban then chose to consolidate his rule over the provincial governors rather than to embark upon expeditions against Hindu territories. Thus, he reacted vigorously and effectively against an attempt to establish an independent state in Bengal in the 1280s.

Balban sought to raise the prestige of the institution of the sultanate through the use of ceremony, the strict administration of justice, and the formulation of a despotic view of the relationship between ruler and subject. Probably the most significant aspect of his reign was this elevation of the position of the sultan, which made possible the reorganization and strengthening of the army and the imposition of a tighter administrative apparatus. Iltutmish had enforced the centre’s control over the nobles in the districts (iqṭāʿs and wilāyahs) by subjecting them to periodic transfers. Balban’s government began to investigate what was actually collected and spent within the iqṭāʿ. He appointed a new category of officials, the khwājas, to estimate both the income of the iqṭāʿ holders and the expenses they incurred in maintaining their troops. Any surplus (fawāḍil) was to be remitted to the sultan’s treasury. Balban’s policy of consolidation, the success of which owed much to the death or incapacity of most of the Forty and to the lack of rival claimants to the throne, strengthened sultanate rule so that his successors could undertake a number of successful expansionist campaigns after 1290.